

THE PACT BETWEEN THE KINGS, POLYBIUS 15.20.6,  
AND POLYBIUS' VIEW OF THE OUTBREAK  
OF THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR

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THE "PACT BETWEEN THE KINGS"—the pact between Philip V of Macedon and Antiochus III of Syria to dismember the Ptolemaic empire, struck circa winter 203/02 B.C.E.—was alleged by Polybius, the great historian of Rome's rise to world power, to be an important event in Mediterranean history. This is clear from his numerous references to it.<sup>1</sup> But just how important did Polybius consider the pact to be? In particular, in Polybius' thought, what was the relationship between the pact and the Roman decision to go to war against Macedon (the Second Macedonian War) in 200 B.C.E.? That war eventually led to Roman military-political hegemony over European Greece and was of supreme importance in the growth of what Polybius calls the *sympleke*, the geopolitical interconnection between the eastern and western parts of the Mediterranean.<sup>2</sup> Prominent scholars have argued that, whereas the pact—if it actually existed (which some doubt)—may have constituted a threat to the Ptolemaic regime, "Polybius makes no suggestion at all that the pact was directly responsible for Roman intervention in the East in 200 and later." Indeed, "we can be sure beyond reasonable doubt that Polybius did not make Roman knowledge of the 'pact' a cause of the war."<sup>3</sup> Other scholars have expressed not a negative judgment but rather agnosticism on what Polybius might have said about the causes of the Second Macedonian War, on the grounds that the fragmentary character of his surviving text concerning this period does not allow an opinion one way or another.<sup>4</sup>

The purpose of the present paper is to argue that we can know more from Polybius' text than was previously thought concerning what the Greek his-

1. Polyb. 3.2.8 (emphatic wording); 15.20 passim (emphatic wording); 16.1.8–9 and 24.6; cf. 14.1a.4. On the probable date of the Pact, see F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, vol. 2 (Oxford, 1967), 472–73.

2. See F. W. Walbank, "Sympleke: Its Role in Polybius' Histories," *YCS* 24 (1975): 197–212, later published in *Selected Papers: Studies in Greek and Roman History and Historiography* (Cambridge, 1985): 313–24.

3. J. P. V. D. Balsdon, "Rome and Macedon, 205–200 B.C.," *JRS* 44 (1954): 37 (the first quote); R. M. Errington, "The Alleged Syro-Macedonian Pact and the Origins of the Second Macedonian War," *Athenaeum* 49 (1971): 354 (the second quote). Those who doubt that the pact ever existed include D. Magie, "The 'Agreement' between Philip V and Antiochus III for the Partition of the Egyptian Empire," *JRS* 29 (1939): 32–44; and Errington, above. Cf. "Antiochos III., Zeuxis und Euromos," *EpigAnat* 17 (1986): p. 8, n. 5; C. Habicht, *Studien zur Geschichte Athens in hellenistischer Zeit* (Göttingen, 1982), 146.

4. So P. S. Derow, "Polybius, Rome and the East," *JRS* 69 (1979): 10.

torian said about the relationship between the pact between the kings and the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War. To be sure, we have lost Polybius' account of the Roman decision of 201/200, which must have been highly detailed; we must make do with the small fragments that survive of what he wrote concerning the crisis in the Mediterranean in 203–200. Nevertheless, enough evidence exists to indicate that the pact played a significant role in the reasons Polybius gave for the decision at Rome in 201/200 to intervene in the Greek East.

The most important statement is found in Polybius 15.20, and this passage is the focus of the present paper. Polybius 15.20 is not an account of the specific terms of the pact between the kings; Polybius' description of those terms probably appeared in the immediately preceding passage, which is now lost.<sup>5</sup> Rather, 15.20 is a heavily moralizing and negative commentary on the character of the pact. Philip and Antiochus are described in 15.20 as men without conscience or morality, as impious savages and rapacious tyrants and beasts, taking ruthless advantage of the weak regime of Ptolemy V, who was only a child (15.20.3–4). But, Polybius continues (20.5), people who find fault with Fortune (Tyche) for her conduct of human affairs will now be reconciled with her when they learn how she made the two kings pay the due penalty for their conduct by inflicting heavy punishment upon them: “For even while they were still breaking their compact with one another and destroying the kingdom of the child, she [Tyche] alerted the Romans [ἐπιστήσασα Ῥωμαίους . . .], and very justly and properly visited upon the kings the very evils which they had been in total lawlessness designing to bring upon others” (20.6). Thus, Polybius continues, the Romans soon militarily defeated Philip and then Antiochus, so that the kings were not only prevented from lusting after the possessions of others but were forced to submit to Rome and obey Roman orders (20.7). And eventually, whereas the situation of the Ptolemaic House revived, the Antigonids were brought to utter destruction and the Seleucids to a condition approaching it (20.8).

For our purposes, the key phrase in Polybius 15.20 is at 15.20.6: ἐπιστήσασα Ῥωμαίους [ἢ Τύχη]. Traditionally, scholars have translated this phrase as “Fortune raised up the Romans against them [the kings],” namely, “set the Romans on them.” That is, 15.20.6 is describing an impersonal metaphysical process by which Fortune herself readjusted the balance of power against Philip and Antiochus because of their lawless greed against the child Ptolemy, employing (“raising up”) the Romans as her military instrument to do so.<sup>6</sup> This interpretation of ἐπιστήσασα Ῥωμαίους originated 400 years ago with Isaac Casaubon, in his pioneering edition of the text of the *Histories*; Casaubon's text was accompanied by a Latin translation, and Casaubon

5. See Walbank, *Commentary* (n. 1 above), 2:472–73.

6. So J. L. Strachan-Davidson, *Selections from Polybius* (Oxford, 1888), p. 398, n. 6: “Fortune set the Romans on them”; E. S. Shuckburgh, *The “Histories” of Polybius*, vol. 2 (London, 1889), 153: “Fortune brought the Romans upon them”; W. R. Paton, *Polybius: The “Histories,”* vol. 4 (Cambridge, Mass., 1925), 509: “Fortune raised up against them the Romans”; D. Roussel, *Polybe: “Histoires”* (Paris, 1970), 781: “Fortune a dressé contre eux les Romains”; I. Scott-Kilvert, *The Rise of the Roman Empire* (Harmondsworth, UK, 1979), 483: “Fortune brought the Romans upon them”; most recently, M. Mari, *Polibio: “Storie,”* vol. V, *Libri XII–XVIII* (Milan, 2003), 205: “La fortuna . . . esse chiamò in causa i Romani.”

translated 15.20.6 as *Fortuna Romanis in eos immissis ac concitatis*. This translation was then confirmed by Johannes Schweighaeuser in his great 1789–95 edition of Polybius, an edition that included a Greek text slightly expanded from Casaubon's text, a Latin translation, a commentary, and a lexicon of Polybian word usage; the verb Schweighaeuser chose to employ at 15.20.6 was *opponere*.<sup>7</sup>

It is difficult to go against such great and pioneering figures as Casaubon and Schweighaeuser, and few scholars have given the translation of 15.20.6 much careful inspection since Schweighaeuser. Yet Casaubon and Schweighaeuser have been challenged 15.20.6, if only briefly. The first scholar to do so was Passerini (no mean figure himself), who translated ἐπιστήσασα Ῥωμαίους at 15.20.6 as "Fortune attracted the attention of the Romans to them [the kings]": "richiamando l'attenzione dei Romani." In support of his translation, Passerini adduced only one passage: Polyb. 2.61.11, where ἐπιστήσαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας means to turn the attention of the hearer to a specific issue.<sup>8</sup> In 1967 Walbank supported Passerini, asserting briefly that the usual translation of 15.20.6 ("to raise up the Romans against them") had no Polybian parallel, and suggesting that the sense of ἐφίστημι in 15.20.6 was likely to be "drawing the attention of the Romans" to the kings.<sup>9</sup> But Walbank's acceptance of Passerini has had little subsequent impact—perhaps because it was only a brief *obiter dictum*—as one can see from the translations of Roussel (1970) and even of Scott-Kilvert (1979), for whose translation Walbank himself wrote the introduction. Among translators, only Weil, in 1995, followed Passerini and Walbank; but again he offered no discussion or supporting argument for his translation.<sup>10</sup> Thus most scholars assume that ἐπιστήσασα Ῥωμαίους means that Fortune personally "raised up the Romans" against the kings in a direct act of balance of power, while a very few take the phrase to mean that Fortune "drew the attention of the Romans" to the problem, but do not engage in an argument in favor of this translation.<sup>11</sup>

The issue and the distinction is important, for if Polybius, in commenting on the pact between the kings in 15.20.6, means that "Fortune alerted the Romans"—that is, "Fortune attracted the attention of the Romans to the bad conduct of the two kings"—then this gives us an insight into important elements of his discussion of the decision at Rome in 201/200 to intervene in the East. That discussion (as we have said) is unfortunately lost, but if this

7. I. Casaubon, *Polybius* (Amsterdam, 1609), 986, on 15.20; J. Schweighaeuser, *Polybii Megalopolitani "historiarum" quidquid superest* (Leipzig, 1789–95), at 15.20, and cf. *Lexicon Polybianum* (Oxford, 1822), s.v. *opponere*.

8. A. Passerini, "Un episodio della battaglia di Zama," *Athenaeum* 14 (1936): p. 182, n. 1. Passerini was commenting, in an aside, on Polybius' use of ἐπέστησε at 15.13.7 and 14.3 to mean "to station troops at a part of the battlefield."

9. Walbank, *Commentary* 2:474.

10. Roussel, "*Histoires*," and Scott-Kilvert, *Rise* (n. 6 above). R. Weil, *Polybe: "Histoires," xiii–xvi* (Paris, 1995) at 15.20: "Quand la Fortune attira l'attention des Romains."

11. In fact, Walbank himself accepted the traditional translation of 15.20.6 in "Supernatural Paraphernalia in Polybius," in *Ventures into Greek History*, ed. I. Worthington (Oxford, 1994), 36: "Fortune brought the Romans upon them [sc. Philip and Antiochus]." This was later published in F. W. Walbank, *Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World: Essays and Reflections* (Cambridge, 2002), 251. But in a private communication with the author, June 27, 1996, Walbank returned to the position on 15.20.6 he had taken in *Commentary* 2; see also n. 38 below.

is the correct meaning of 15.20.6, it indicates that Polybius, in the discussion of the Roman decision stressed the importance to Roman decision making of an event we already know of, mostly from other sources: the arrival at Rome of Greek embassies complaining about the aggressive conduct of the kings. These embassies, we are told by some of our sources (though, as it happens, not in any extant Polybian passage), stressed the existence of the pact.<sup>12</sup>

We know that at least four states sent embassies to Rome in 201/200 complaining of the actions of Philip and/or Antiochus: these were Egypt, Pergamum, Rhodes, and Athens.<sup>13</sup> These states acted because they were directly threatened with a new intensity by Philip and/or Antiochus—part of a system-wide crisis in the eastern Mediterranean caused by the rapidly increasing power and aggression of the two kings, which followed upon the collapse of the power of the Ptolemaic dynasty based in Egypt. The Ptolemaic collapse had begun with a great indigenous rebellion in Upper and Middle Egypt circa 207 or 206, which the government found very difficult to put down, and the collapse accelerated in 204 with the premature death of Ptolemy IV and the accession of the child Ptolemy V to the throne. There followed a series of caretaker governments at Alexandria. These regimes could not regain control of the Middle and Upper Nile Valleys, where a series of indigenous Pharaohs was consecrated as rulers according to traditional Egyptian ritual.<sup>14</sup> Worse, these caretaker governments did not even have firm control of the capital of Alexandria itself—where there were coups, riots, and assassinations.<sup>15</sup> Polybius emphasized the importance of the Ptolemaic collapse through a sharp change in his standard method of historiographical presentation; normally each volume of the *Histories* was organized as a *tour d'horizon* of events in the several regions Mediterranean (Africa, Spain, Italy, Greece, the Near East, Egypt), covering two-year periods, but Book 14 was almost totally devoted to events in Egypt (14.12.1).<sup>16</sup>

By the summer of 201, the collapse of Ptolemaic power had resulted in the outbreak of warfare reaching from Gaza (as Antiochus III advanced overland

12. The Greek embassies' warnings to the Senate about the pact: App. *Mac.* 4; Just. *Epit.* 30.2.8. Justin has the warning about the pact coming from Egypt; Appian has the warning coming from Rhodes (and by implication from Pergamum).

13. A general statement on the dispatch of the Greek embassies to Rome: Polyb. 16.24.3. From Egypt: Livy 31.9.1–5; Just. *Epit.* 30.2.8. From Pergamum and Rhodes: Livy 31.2.1; Just. *Epit.* 30.3.5; App. *Mac.* 4. From Athens: Livy 31.1.9–10, 31.5.2, and 5.5–8; cf. App. *Mac.* 4. One of the Athenian ambassadors was probably the prominent politician Cephisodorus: Paus. 1.36.6; cf. L. Moretti, ed., *Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche*, vol. 1 (Florence, 1967), no. 33. A fifth embassy is indicated by Appian (*Mac.* 4) and Livy (31.29.4): that of the Aetolian League, which came to Rome in this period to complain about Philip, but which was rejected by the Senate on grounds that the Aetolians had proven unfaithful allies during Rome's first conflict with Macedon in 212/11–205 B.C.E. The date and the historicity of the Aetolian embassy are disputed: for the issues and arguments, see conveniently E. S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1984), p. 396, n. 214.

14. On the great revolt in the Thebaid, see now P. W. Pestman, "Haronnophris and Chaonnophris: Two Indigenous Pharaohs in Ptolemaic Egypt," in *Hundred Gated Thebes*, ed. S. P. Vleeming (Leiden, 1995), 101–37. For Egyptian rebellions in general, see B. McGing, "Revolt Egyptian Style: Internal Opposition to Ptolemaic Rule," *APF* 43 (1997): 273–314.

15. On just one of the periods of turbulence at Alexandria, see in detail Polyb. 15.24a–36.

16. A gloss on Polyb. 14.12.3 says that Polybius' discussion of Egypt in this volume covered 48 quarto pages (Walbank, *Commentary* 2:434–35).

southwards from Syria) to the Aegean (where Philip V advanced southwards by land and sea to southwest Asia Minor). Polybius believed that Philip's aim was ultimately a landing at Alexandria (16.10)—that is, the total overthrow of the Ptolemaic dynasty.<sup>17</sup> The crisis in the southern Aegean and western Asia Minor led to the formation of a military alliance against Philip between the middle-sized powers of the region: the Republic of Rhodes and the Kingdom of Pergamum. This development itself shows the severity of the crisis, since Pergamum and Rhodes were traditional rivals, and only the most serious of geopolitical threats could have led them to form an alliance. But even together they were able merely to hold their own against Philip.<sup>18</sup> And there is evidence that the Rhodians for some time before 197 feared that Antiochus would be joining Philip.<sup>19</sup> Thus in late summer 201, as naval war raged in the southern Aegean, both Rhodes and Pergamum despatched embassies to Italy to ask the Romans to intervene in this crisis.<sup>20</sup> That King Attalus of Pergamum would ask for aid from Rome in this crisis is not so surprising, since Attalus had been an ally of the Romans against Macedon in the First Macedonian War (212/11–205 B.C.E.), and had recently helped the Romans bring to Italy the cult object of the Great Mother of Pessinus in central Asia Minor, in response to a Sibylline oracle on how the Romans might be victorious in the Hannibalic War.<sup>21</sup> The Rhodian embassy to Rome, on the other hand, was a startling reversal of policy: the Rhodians had previously not only tried to mediate the First Macedonian War with little concern for Roman interests, but in those mediation efforts had publicly opposed Roman involvement in Greek politics in the strongest terms (cf. Polyb. 11.4–6). Like the unprecedented Rhodian alliance with Pergamum, the Rhodian decision now to accompany the Pergamenes to Rome to ask for help demonstrates the seriousness of the crisis.<sup>22</sup>

Moreover, in late summer 201, as Philip engaged in his campaign of conquest in the southern Aegean, a crisis also developed in relations between Macedon and Athens. The Athenians executed two citizens of Acarnania, a state allied with Macedon, on the grounds that the men had violated the Mysteries of Eleusis (September 201); in retaliation came a raid into Attica by Acarnanian and Macedonian forces (November, 201?). Part of the response to the raid was (it seems) a vote in the Athenian Assembly abolishing the Athenian tribal units named a century earlier in honor of Philip's ancestors, the Macedonian kings Antigonus I and Demetrius I (for their liberation of Athens from the Macedonian ruler Cassander in 307). The "Macedonian"

17. Cf. Walbank, *Commentary* 2:511–12.

18. On the long-term rivalry between Pergamum and Rhodes and the sudden alliance of 201 against Philip, see now H.-U. Wiemer, *Krieg, Handel und Piraterie: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des hellenistischen Rhodos* (Berlin, 2002), 177–233.

19. See Livy 33.19.6–20.13, drawn from Polybian material (cf. Polyb. 18.41a.1), with J. Briscoe, *A Commentary on Livy, Books XXXI–XXXIII* (Oxford, 1973), 284, and H. R. Rawlings, "Antiochus the Great and Rhodes," *AJAH* 1 (1976): 1–2.

20. On the pressing military circumstances in which the Rhodian and Pergamene embassies were probably despatched to Italy, see G. T. Griffith, "An Early Motive of Roman Imperialism," *CHJ* 5 (1935): 1–14.

21. See P. J. Burton, "The Coming of the Great Mother to Rome," *Historia* 47 (1996): 312–35.

22. See A. M. Eckstein, "Greek Mediation in the First Macedonian War (209–205 B.C.)," *Historia* 53 (2002): 268–97, esp. 288–91 and 297; cf. also n. 25 below.

tribes at Athens (two of twelve) were integral to the structure of Athenian politics, and had survived the Athenians' turbulent relationship with Demetrius I in the 290s and 280s, the Chremonidean War against Macedon in the 260s, and even the definitive liberation of Athens from its Macedonian garrison in 229; only now were they abolished.<sup>23</sup> The sequence of events starting with the execution of the Acarnanians suggests an intense underlying hostility to Philip; such hostility represented a true volte-face in Athenian policy, which for the previous three decades had pursued strict neutrality among the three monarchical great powers. It is worth noting that the Athenian archon-year 201/200 (starting in late spring 201) had begun with a special honoring of the tribe Ptolemais to lead the year, out of the normal order of tribal rotation—which already suggests Athenian sympathy towards the Ptolemies, now under attack by both Philip and Antiochus.<sup>24</sup> Now threatened themselves by Macedon, the Athenians despatched an embassy to the Ptolemaic court to ask for military help against Philip. But the response they received seems to have been that the Athenians should ask Rome for help. The Ptolemies apparently already had (see p. 231 and n. 13 above).<sup>25</sup>

On the translation of 15.20.6 that we are offering here, these four Greek embassies, which all came to Rome in winter 201/200, would have constituted in Polybius' view the real-world instruments of Tyche in attracting the Romans' attention to the grave geopolitical situation in the East. Moreover, if the above translation of 15.20.6 is the correct one, it indicates that Polybius not only highlighted the importance of the Greek embassies in drawing the attention of the Romans to unstable conditions in the East in a general way, but also showed that the focus of the Greek embassies at Rome was on the specific threat posed by the pact between Philip and Antiochus. That was a good part of their message. Further, Polybius indicates that not only was the attention of the Romans drawn by Tyche to the conduct of the kings, but that the Romans then acted upon their new perception: hence, what followed upon the Romans' attention being drawn to the kings and their pact (15.20.6) was the military defeat of the kings by Rome (15.20.7–8). If Polybius is indicating at 15.20.6 that Fortune, by alerting the Romans to the Eastern

23. On the crisis between Macedon and Athens in 201/200, and the abolition of the "Macedonian" tribes, see Habicht, *Geschichte Athens* (n. 3 above), 142–49.

24. The political importance of the tribe Ptolemais' leading the Athenian year 201/200 out of order is rightly stressed by Briscoe, *Commentary* (n. 19 above), p. 43, n. 1. But he notes only Antiochus' attack on Egypt. By late spring 201, Philip V—previously officially friendly to the Ptolemies—had seized the major Ptolemaic naval base at Samos, and throughout the summer he attacked Ptolemaic dependencies in the southern Aegean. Some of his operations in Asia Minor were indirectly supported by forces of Antiochus (Polyb. 16.1.8–9 and 24.6). On Philip's own converse cooperation with Antiochus in seizing Ptolemaic territory in southwest Asia Minor in 201, see the new and startling "Three Kings" inscription from Bargylia, with the comments of B. Dreyer, "Der 'Raubvertrag' des Jahres 203/2 v. Chr.: Das Inschriftenfragment von Bargylia und der Brief von Amyzon," *EpigAnat* 34 (2002): 119–38. The Athenians would have known all of this.

25. The Athenian embassy to Alexandria: Livy 31.9.1–5; cf. Paus. 1.36.5 and Moretti, *Iscrizioni* (n. 13 above), no. 33. Note that like the Rhodians, but in a manner less publicly offensive, both the Ptolemies and the Athenians had worked against Roman interests in 209–206 B.C.E. by offering mediation of the war in Greece, mediation that the Romans did not want: see Eckstein, "Greek Mediation" (n. 22 above), *passim*. Hence, the arrival of the Rhodians, Egyptians, and Athenians at Rome in winter 201/200 to ask for help from the Romans constituted a true diplomatic revolution in the Mediterranean (*ibid.*, 297–98).

situation (through the Greek embassies of 201/200), caused these military developments, it follows that in his detailed description of the crucial Roman decision of 200, he depicted the message of the Greek embassies as having had significant impact on Roman thinking.

It thus turns out that the stakes on the correct translation of ἐπιστήσασα Ῥωμαίους at 15.20.6 are high. The proper translation of this passage affects our concept of how Polybius described the Roman decision to launch the Second Macedonian War. The case for the Passerini and Walbank translation has, however, never been argued in detail before (and was not so argued by them). Yet a strong case can in fact be made that Passerini and Walbank are correct in their translation. Passerini showed the method to employ, though he did not take it very far—namely, by adducing and addressing the trend of usage of the verb ἐφίστημι in the surviving Polybian text. That is the method now employed here.

The verb ἐφίστημι has multiple meanings in Polybius. It can mean “to put” something onto something else (cf. 3.46.8 and 30.10.2), and hence, by extension, it sometimes means to put someone in command over troops.<sup>26</sup> Very often it means to station troops in a certain place; the troops involved in this action garrison a spot, and passively await events. This is by far the most common military usage of ἐφίστημι in Polybius.<sup>27</sup> Often, the term describes troops in the rear ranks, as opposed to frontline fighters.<sup>28</sup> In fact, not infrequently ἐφίστημι in a military context in Polybius actually means “to halt a forward movement.”<sup>29</sup> This does not sound like the usage demanded of ἐφίστημι at 15.20.6 by Casaubon and Schweighaeuser.

Indeed, other than the meaning of 15.20.6 proposed by Casaubon himself, there is no case in the extant Polybian text where ἐφίστημι can mean to stir up or excite or recruit (as Casaubon suggests).<sup>30</sup> Can ἐφίστημι mean, then, “to attack”—or, rather, “cause to attack”—the other meaning suggested at 15.20.6 by Casaubon and Schweighaeuser?<sup>31</sup> Aside from 15.20.6 itself again, there are only two cases in the entire extant Polybian text where ἐφίστημι could have the meaning “to attack” (4.58.2, 8.37.10); but it is not certain in either case that ἐφίστημι does mean literally “to attack.”<sup>32</sup> And if

26. See A. Mauersberger, *Polybios-Lexikon*, vol. 1, pt. 2 (Berlin, 1961), s.v. ἐφίστημι (col. 1059; eleven cases). The new edition—C. F. Collatz-M. Gutzlaf-H. Helms, eds., *Polybios-Lexikon*, vol. 1, pt. 2 (Berlin, 2003)—is the same as Mauersberger on ἐφίστημι.

27. Mauersberger, *Lexikon* (n. 26 above), coll. 1059–60 and 1062; thirty-six cases.

28. Nine cases in the active voice (Mauersberger, *Lexikon*, coll. 1059–60), fourteen cases in the middle voice (ibid., col. 1062), for a total of twenty-three cases.

29. Eleven cases: Polyb. 1.46.11, 8.14.2, 8.29.3, 10.12.1, 14.7.5, 15.32.3, 16.34.2, 18.19.7, 18.26.9, 36.8.3, frag. 13 B-W. See Mauersberger, *Lexikon*, coll. 1060 and 1062.

30. *Concitat*: see p. 230 above.

31. *Immissis* (Casaubon); *opponere* (Schweighaeuser): see p. 230 above.

32. At 4.58.2, Polybius may mean that those people in the town of Aegeira whose houses were attacked by the Aetolian enemy (ἐπέστησαν οἱ πόλεμιοι: so, e.g., Paton ad loc.) now fled; but Schuckburgh, “*Histories*” (n. 6 above), ad loc., has Polybius meaning that the houses were “entered” by the enemy. The stronger case is 8.37.10, which one can translate to mean that the Romans in their night assault on the walls of Syracuse “suddenly attacked the first and second groups” of sleepy Syracusan soldiers and killed most of them (ἐπιστάντες . . . ἀποκτείναντες: cf. Paton, “*Histories*” [n. 6 above] and Schuckburgh, “*Histories*,” ad loc.; Mauersberger, *Lexikon*, col. 1062: *angreifen*; *überfallen*). Even here, though, one might translate the phrase as “coming suddenly upon the first and second groups . . . they killed most of them.”

the use of ἐφίστημι meaning “to attack” is (at best) very rare in the Polybian text, there is simply no example of ἐφίστημι meaning “to cause someone to attack,” “to set someone upon another.” In fact, in both the first and now the second edition of the modern *Polybios-Lexikon*, Casaubon’s and Schweighaeuser’s proposed meaning of ἐφίστημι in the active voice at 15.20.6—in Mauserberger’s terms, *in d. Weg treten lassen; entgegentreten lassen*—appears only at 15.20.6 itself. That is: there are no parallels in the Polybian text. This should immediately arouse concern.<sup>33</sup>

By contrast, as we have seen, Passerini pointed to Polybius 2.61.11 as a key to understanding 15.20.6. At 2.61.11, Polybius, writing of the loyalty of the people of Megalopolis to the Achaean League despite the great damage they incurred from Sparta, says: ἐπὶ τί δ’ ἂν μᾶλλον συγγραφεὺς ἐπιστήσῃ τοὺς ἀκούοντας, that is, “to what better example [of noble behavior] could an author call the attention of his audience?” Passerini concluded from 2.61.11 that ἐφίστημι in Polybius could mean *attentionem lectoris convertere in aliquid*. And since this was the meaning of ἐφίστημι at 2.61.11, it could also be the meaning of ἐφίστημι at 15.20.6, rather than *immissis ac concitatis* or *opponere*: “What is to prevent this?”<sup>34</sup> But the answer is that with only one example of this usage of ἐφίστημι as evidence, there is much to prevent it. One should be cautious about offering an interpretation of 15.20.6, a passage with extraordinarily important historical and historiographical implications, on the basis of a single Polybian usage—and that usage thirteen volumes earlier. So the example of 2.61.11, standing alone, is not enough. Walbank advanced discussion by pointing out that the usual translation “Fortune, raising the Romans up against them [*sc.* Philip and Antiochus] . . .” was itself unparalleled.<sup>35</sup> Even so, if the argument over the meaning of 15.20.6 had to end at this point, we would be left with a conundrum.

But the argument by no means has to end at this point. There are in fact two dozen passages in Polybius where ἐφίστημι is employed, in the active or middle voice, to mean “to alert someone,” or “to draw someone’s attention to something”: in Mauersberger’s and Collatz-Gutlaf-Helms’ terms *Augen öffnen; aufmerksam machen; bekannt machen*. Moreover, it is significant that what usually follows the act of “alerting [someone]” or “drawing someone’s attention to” a previously unperceived situation or problem is a change of attitude or policy by the party whose attention has been affected. Granting our translation of 15.20.6, that is what Polybius is implying occurred at Rome in winter 201/200. These passages with ἐφίστημι occur throughout the Polybian text, both before and after 15.20.6.

For instance, at 5.85.12, at the battle of Raphia, an experienced officer of Antiochus III draws the king’s attention to the movement of dust on the plain, suggesting there now is a threat to Antiochus’ camp from the Egyptian phalanx (ἐπιστήσαντος); Antiochus thereupon reverses course, and returns

33. Mauersberger, *Lexikon*, col. 1060; and now Collatz-Gutlaf-Helms, *Lexikon* (n. 26 above), s.v.; see the warning of Walbank, *Commentary* 2:474.

34. Passerini, “Zama” (n. 8 above), p. 182, n. 1.

35. *Commentary* 2:474.



from foolishly pursuing the enemy with his cavalry. At 23.11.4, Polybius has Philip V call the attention of his sons to the dual kingship in Sparta (ἐπέστησα); Philip's goal is to get his sons to stop quarrelling, and to incite them instead to family unity, by drawing their attention to Sparta (23.11.2–3). At 27.9.6, Polybius says that if one can alert the populace to their errors of policy at the right time (ἐπιστήσῃ), they will soon change their minds and ways, and correct them. The historian speaks in a very similar vein at 27.10.2 about alerting the populace to their errors (ἐπιστήσας), and thus changing their ideas and policies. At 30.6.1, Polybius says that he is directing the attention of his readers to the case of Deinon and Polyaratus (ἐπιστήσαντες), in order to stimulate readers to follow not these examples of cowardly conduct, but rather to follow their opposite, noble conduct. At 38.8.4, Scipio Aemilianus' attention is drawn to the uncertainties of war by the words of the general Golossus (ἐπιστήσας); Scipio, in response, then offers milder terms than he had originally intended to the Carthaginian leader Hasdrubal. All these passages, in fact, follow the format of the original example adduced by Passerini long ago: at 2.61.11, Polybius, in calling the attention of his audience to the loyalty of Megalopolis to the Achaean League (ἐπιστήσαι), has the goal of affecting his audience's behavior and policies; he hopes this information about the Megalopolitans will inspire his audience to good conduct—to be true to their word.<sup>36</sup>

There is no question, then, that Polybius often uses ἐφίστημι to mean “to alert someone,” “to draw someone's attention to something,” usually with the goal of changing attitude, actions, or policies. This usage is frequent in the Polybian text—as opposed to the *hapax legomenon* proposed at 15.20.6, “Fortune raised up [or brought] the Romans against Philip and Antiochus [i.e., caused the Romans to attack them].” It is true, however, that often the grammatical construction Polybius employs to describe someone's attention being called to something is ἐφίστημι as a transitive verb with a preposition, usually ἐπί. In other words, many examples in the Polybian text require that someone be alerted “to something.” This is the construction at 2.61.11, Passerini's original example: “to what better model [of noble behavior] can a writer draw the attention of his audience [ἐπὶ τί δ' αὖν μάλλον]” than the actions of the Megalopolitans? Again, at 23.11.4, Polybius has Philip V of Macedon say to his sons: ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ Λακεδαιμονίᾳ βασιλεῖς . . . ἐπέστησα. Or there is 30.6.1, where the historian in his own persona says, “I have already drawn the attention of the audience to the actions of Deinon and Polyaratus”: ἐπιστήσαντες . . . ἐπὶ τὴν περὶ Δεινῶνος . . . Many other examples of this or very similar grammatical construction can be cited.<sup>37</sup> And if Polybius always employed this grammatical construction, with ἐπί or

36. Other examples of ἐφίστημι as “to call attention to,” “to alert someone to something”: 4.34.9, 6.26.12, 6.45.1, 9.23.1, 29.21.2, 29.21.8, 38.8.4, frag. 52 B-W. Conversely, “to pay attention to”: 1.3.9, 1.14.1, 1.65.5, 4.40.1, 6.4.11, 10.47.8, 12.25f.3, 12.25k.7, 15.9.3.

37. See Polyb. 1.3.9, 1.65.5, 4.34.9, 4.40.1, 6.4.11, 9.23.1, 12.25f.3, 15.9.3, 28.21.2, 29.21.2, frag. 52 B-W. In addition, we find ἐφίστημι used in the sense of “to alert” or “to draw someone's attention to something” employed with περὶ (6.26.12); with κατά (6.45.1); with the dative object (1.14.1); and with the genitive (10.47.8, 38.8.4).

another preposition linked to ἐφίστημι when he means “to alert someone [to something],” or “to draw someone’s attention to something,” this would greatly undermine Passerini and Walbank’s translation of 15.20.6, because that is not the construction at 15.20.6: ἐπιστήσασα Ῥωμαίους. That is, at 15.20.6 ἐφίστημι is certainly transitive, but it has no prepositional phrase modifying the verb.

In fact, however, we have several examples where Polybius does use ἐφίστημι to mean “to alert someone” or “to draw someone’s attention to” without employing a prepositional phrase beginning with ἐπί or a similar term—exactly the grammatical construction we find at 15.20.6.

An excellent example is Polybius 27.9.6, where Polybius is criticizing the attitude of the masses towards the war between Rome and Perseus of Macedon in 172–68. The masses (ὁ ὄχλος, οἱ πολλοί) irrationally supported Perseus because he was the underdog in the war against Rome and had won surprising victories; they acted as if the war were a wrestling match, and not a situation requiring serious political decision making on their part (27.9.1–5), because the masses have a natural instinct to favor the weaker. “But if someone alerts them at the right time,” Polybius continues—οὗς ἂν ἐπιστήσῃ τις—“they very soon change their mind and correct their attitude [μετατίθενται]” (9.6). This is, therefore, a case where the grammatical construction exactly parallels 15.20.6: those who are being alerted are in the accusative (οὗς; cf. Ῥωμαίους at 15.20.6), with no prepositional phrase introduced by (say) ἐπί.<sup>38</sup>

Polybius 27.10.2 is similar. Here Polybius returns to his point about the shallowness of Greek public opinion during the Third Macedonian War, but now his argument is that the war was not a war for Greek freedom, because if Perseus had won the war, then Greece would have fallen back under the domination of Macedon.<sup>39</sup> The masses (ὁ ὄχλος) failed to realize this, but their attitude could have been changed: “For if anyone had secured their attention [εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιστήσας αὐτοῦς],” and asked them whether they really wanted to experience all of Greece under the tyranny of a reckless man like Perseus, they would soon have come to their senses and undergone a reversion of feeling. Once more we have the persons being alerted in the accusative (αὐτοῦς), with no modifying phrase introduced by ἐπί or a similar preposition. It is another exact parallel with the grammatical construction at 15.20.6.

Again, at 5.85.12 Polybius is describing the rash conduct of Antiochus III at the battle of Raphia in 217 B.C.E. (see pp. 235–36 above): at the head of his cavalry, he had foolhardily pursued the part of the Ptolemaic army that he had defeated, but the main Egyptian phalanx was now marching on his camp. “At length, however, when one of his experienced officers alerted him [ἐπιστήσαντος αὐτόν],” pointing out the dust cloud of the advancing Egyptian army, Antiochus realized what had now happened; he abandoned

38. The example of Polyb. 27.9.6 was pointed out to the author by F. W. Walbank in a private communication (June 27, 1996) on 15.20.6.

39. For discussion of how Polybius’ view of Roman hegemony was tempered by the long Achaean experience of the domination of Macedon, see F. W. Walbank, “Polybius and Macedonia,” in *Ancient Macedonia*, vol. 1, ed. B. Laourdas and Ch. Makaronas (Thessalonica, 1970), 291–307, later published in Walbank, *Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World* (n. 11 above), 91–106.

his pursuit and attempted to return to the main battlefield (he was too late). The grammatical construction at 5.85.12 is the same as at 15.20.6: the person being alerted is in the accusative (αὐτὸν), after a participle, with no modifying phrase introduced by ἐπί or a similar preposition. This is a third parallel to the grammatical construction at 15.20.6.

These parallels provide decisive support for the hypothesis that what Polybius means in 15.20 is, indeed, that Tyche acted in the great crisis in the eastern Mediterranean in 203–200 by “alerting the Romans” (20.6). Nor are we uninformed about what exactly Tyche made the Romans attend to. The only subject in 15.20 is the pact between the kings (cf. 15.20.1–5 passim), and the pact receives prominent mention at the beginning of 15.20.6 itself: ἔτι γὰρ αὐτῶν παρασπονδούντων ἀλλήλους. . . . Clearly, in Polybius’ view, the pact is what Tyche made the Romans attend to. Nor are we uninformed about what the Roman response was, once they had been alerted. Polybius continues in 15.20.7–9 that Tyche employed the Romans to punish Antiochus and Philip for their savagery towards the child Ptolemy V by visiting upon both their dynasties exactly what they had planned together, in their pact, for the Ptolemies (20.7–8).

It is true that the focus in 15.20 is on Tyche herself—her workings in history. The instrumentalities through which she worked are merely mentioned or, in the case of the Greek embassies to Rome in 201/200, have to be inferred. This should cause no surprise: it is well known that Polybius found the workings of Fortune in history of great importance. His conception of Tyche varies: sometimes she is chance or random occurrence; sometimes she is fate or guiding destiny; sometimes—as in 15.20—she is retributive justice. Polybius was particularly drawn to the prediction of Demetrius of Phalerum, in his essay *Peri Tyches* of circa 300 B.C.E., that Tyche in the future would unexpectedly contrive the fall of the Macedonian power just as, in the previous fifty years, Tyche had unexpectedly brought down the Persian power—a prediction Polybius felt was “godlike,” for it had come true (see the very emphatic 29.21).<sup>40</sup> But none of this means that below the metaphysical level, at the secular level, Polybius did not pay careful attention to the political mechanisms of the real world: on the contrary, he often conceived the causes of events as working on the metaphysical and secular tracks simultaneously.<sup>41</sup> So we are permitted to ask just how was it that “Tyche alerted the Romans”—that is, alerted them to the evil pact between the kings—and thus inflicted punishment on Philip and Antiochus. The

40. On the complex place of Tyche in Polybius’ historical writing, see F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1957), 16–26. On Tyche as retributive justice in the case of Macedon, see Walbank, “Supernatural Paraphernalia” (n. 11 above), 36–39 = *Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World*, 251–54. On Polybius, Tyche, and Demetrius of Phalerum, see F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, vol. 3 (Oxford, 1979), 393–95. Polybius thought of Demetrius’ prediction as something “more than human” (ὥσανεὶ θεῶν τινὶ στόματι, 29.21.7). Note that he placed Demetrius’ prediction in Book 29, which was the original ending point of the *Histories*: see Walbank, “Supernatural Paraphernalia,” 36 = *Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World*, 251–52. Tyche of course makes an early appearance in the *Histories* as the engineer of the rise of Rome to world power: see 1.4.1–5.

41. See the discussion in Walbank, “Supernatural Paraphernalia,” 28–42, esp. 30–31 = *Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World*, 250–51.

answer appears to be that Polybius, just like every other Greek historical writer concerned with these events, highlighted the importance of the Greek embassies that went to Rome in 201/200 to complain about the aggressions of Philip and/or Antiochus. More specifically, we can now say that he highlighted what the embassies warned about the pact.

It is in fact already clear from another Polybian passage, which has not received the attention it deserves, that in Polybius' view embassies from the Greek states played a significant role in the Roman decision to intervene in the Greek East in 201/200. At 16.24.2–3, Polybius depicts Philip V, operating in Caria in autumn 201, as not wishing to spend the winter in Asia Minor; rather, he wishes to return to Europe—because he fears both the Aetolians and the Romans (24.2), and knows about, and fears, the embassies from Greek states that have been sent to Rome (24.3). The implication is that the Roman response to the complaints of the Greek embassies might cause him great trouble (and might even be a military response).<sup>42</sup> As the passage stands, the precise nature of the Greek complaints to the Romans about Philip is unclear, and of course some Greek states had enough to complain about regarding Philip's actions even if there had been no pact between the kings at all. But as we have just seen, Polybius 15.20.6, when it is properly understood, clarifies that in Polybius the pact played a large part in the representations of the Greek envoys at Rome. Moreover, the context of 16.24.2–3 is Philip's war with Rhodes and Pergamum (the blockade of Philip in Bargylia by their fleets), which suggests that Philip is concerned primarily with embassies to Rome from Rhodes and Pergamum.<sup>43</sup> The Greek tradition from which Appian worked is precisely that it was the embassy from Rhodes (presumably supported by Pergamum, whose embassy is mentioned with the Rhodians) that warned the Senate about the pact (App. *Mac.* 4). This suggests at least part of the content of the Greek complaints to the Senate about which Philip at Polybius 16.24.3 is worried.<sup>44</sup>

One may note in this context another Polybian passage that is often overlooked: 14.1a.4. Here the historian says that because of the world-historical importance of events beyond this chronological point in his narrative, the 144th Olympiad (i.e., from winter 203/02 B.C.E.), he is changing his usual method of presentation and will now go more slowly: one volume will now cover one year of events, instead of the usual two years (14.1a.5, cf. 1–2). Polybius explains that he is making the change for two reasons. In part, it is because he is now narrating the end of the Hannibalic War (and who would not be curious to know about that?); but in addition, it is because “the character and policy of the kings were clearly revealed in this period. For all that had been hitherto a matter of gossip about them now became clearly known

42. The passage is not evidence that the Aetolians were themselves sending an embassy of complaint to Rome (cf. n. 13 above); rather, Philip is probably worried about Aetolian attacks against Macedonian interests in Europe during his absence in Asia (16.24.2), and καὶ γὰρ, introducing the Greek embassies to Rome (24.3), explains why Philip is concerned with Rome as well as Aetolia; see Walbank, *Commentary* 2:530.

43. See Walbank, *Commentary* 2:530.

44. On the ultimate dependence of App. *Mac.* 4 upon Polybian material, see also n. 55 below.

to everyone, even to those who were not at all disposed to be curious" (14.1a.4). Now, Greek statesmen already knew from two decades of direct and bitter experience that both Philip and Antiochus were highly aggressive and expansionist rulers: this was not rumor, or unconfirmed gossip. What, then, was the unconfirmed gossip that was now shockingly revealed to be true—so shockingly that Polybius has decided to slow down his narrative and explain it? The obvious candidate for the shocking revelation in this period of the full scale of the ambitions and ruthlessness of Philip and Antiochus is their compact to destroy the Ptolemies.<sup>45</sup>

The theme here in 14.1a.4 is thus the same as in 15.20.6: the impact of the revelation of the pact. Polybius 15.20.6 in turn demonstrates—when its language is correctly understood—that a crucial part of the crucial message of the Greek envoys of 201/200 at Rome was to draw the Romans' attention specifically to the pact between Philip and Antiochus (which is, after all, the subject of 15.20). The result of this new knowledge was a sharp turn in senatorial attitude. By spring 200 the Senate had sent out envoys of its own to demand both that Philip refrain from further attacks upon the Greek states and that Antiochus refrain from attacking Egypt proper. And the *Patres* had convinced a reluctant *populus Romanus*, exhausted by the Hannibalic War, to vote for war against Philip if he rejected the Roman ultimatum.<sup>46</sup>

This is not to say that in Polybius' view the pact between the kings was the sole factor that led to the Roman decision to intervene in the Greek East in 200. To be sure, Tyche's punishment for the crime against the child Ptolemy V in the pact between the kings appears to be the key incident upon which Polybius' conception of the fall of Macedonian power rests;<sup>47</sup> but Polybius also accepted that Rome itself was in general an aggressive state, and in Polybius' view Rome's ambition at the end of the Hannibalic War was indeed to control the entire Mediterranean world. So Roman motives must have been important to him.<sup>48</sup> Further, he thought that somehow the Roman war against Philip had its origins in the Hannibalic War (3.32.6)—though what he meant by this statement is not clear to us.<sup>49</sup> But none of this implies that in Polybius' thought Roman intervention in the Greek East was immediately

45. See Walbank, *Commentary* 2:424.

46. For a good reconstruction of the sequence of events in Rome in winter 201/200, and their approximate dates, see V. M. Warrior, *The Initiation of the Second Macedonian War: An Explication of Livy Book 31* (Wiesbaden, 1996), 61–73. Reluctance of the *populus* to vote for a new war: Livy 31.6–7. Note the bitterness of ordinary Romans towards Greek envoys expressed in Plaut. *Stich.* 494–504; this is contemporary evidence—a play produced in autumn 200. Equally, the sudden importance to the *Patres* of Antiochus III and his attack upon Egypt is shown by the fact that the embassy sent to him (the same one sent to demand that Philip stop waging war in the Aegean) appears to mark the first time that Rome ever attempted mediation between two major Greek states—i.e., it is a real departure in Roman conduct. On the historiographical issues surrounding the embassy to Antiochus, see conveniently Gruen, *Coming of Rome* (n. 13 above), 111–12.

47. On Tyche as retributive justice in the fall of Macedonian power, see p. 238 and n. 40 above.

48. See Polyb. 3.2.6; cf. 15.9.2 and 4–5 (where Rome's ambitions are not unique), 15.10.2. Occasionally Polybius puts the conception of the Roman ambition for world conquest earlier, at the end of the First Punic War in 241 B.C.E.: see 1.3.6 and 1.63.9. This theme is stressed as Polybius' primary view of Roman conduct by W. V. Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome*<sup>2</sup> (Oxford, 1984), 108–9.

49. For differing interpretations of 3.32.6, see P. Pédech, ed. and trans. *Polybe: "Histoires," Livre I* (Paris, 1969), xviii; F. W. Walbank, *Polybius* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972), p. 162 and n. 46.

inevitable once the war with Hannibal and Carthage was brought to a victorious end (e.g., because of inherent Roman imperial aggressiveness). If the Senate believed what the Greek envoys said about the pact, then the *Patres* faced the prospect that if Philip and Antiochus were successful in their plans against Egypt, Rome would soon confront two extraordinarily powerful neighbors with a history of great aggressiveness, their resources swollen now with those of the holdings of the Ptolemies, perhaps including Egypt itself. The Senate had already had a taste of the aggressiveness of Philip—for he had struck at Roman interests in the Adriatic from 216 B.C.E. onwards, when Rome appeared to be losing the war with Hannibal. Polybius covered those events in detail, though much of his narrative is lost (see 7.9, the long verbatim text of Philip's treaty of alliance with Hannibal).<sup>50</sup> And if Polybius depicted the Senate as acting in 201/200 at least in part pre emptively against the kings' growing power, he would be in a strong tradition among ancient historical writers who emphasized this motive for state conduct.<sup>51</sup>

In his analytical approach to causation, Polybius liked to emphasize the power of large underlying factors, and large historical patterns, as opposed to contingent events (see Polyb. 1.4.1–5 on Tyche and Rome, or—at a different level—5.67.11–68.1, on the lack of international law). But Polybius also left significant room for what he calls at 3.32.7 “the many and varied intermediate causes” of major events.<sup>52</sup> This is because the Greek historian was interested not merely in underlying causes and historical patterns but also, and primarily (as he often proclaims to his audience), in the question of why humans make the kinds of human decisions they make.<sup>53</sup> Therefore, it may well be that while he accepted the power of underlying factors in the Mediterranean situation of 201/200, including Roman aggressiveness on the one hand and Tyche's punishment of Philip and Antiochus for their own ruthlessness on the other, as far as the actual outbreak of the Second Macedonian War went, Polybius thought of the arrival of the Greek embassies at Rome with the news of the pact between the kings as both a contingent event and a necessary catalyst that moved the Senate—in the actual historical circumstances—to act.<sup>54</sup> Indeed, if our interpretation of 15.20.6 is correct, then

50. That Philip was the aggressor in what is called the First Macedonian War is generally accepted: see conveniently Eckstein, “Greek Mediation,” 270–71. An exception is Harris, *War and Imperialism* (n. 48 above), 205–8.

51. See Hdt. 1.46 and 5.91, cf. 6.138.2–4; Thuc. 1.23.5–6, 1.90.1–2, 1.92, and 1.118.2, with the comments of P. S. Derow, “Historical Explanation: Polybius and his Predecessors,” in *Greek Historiography*, ed. S. Hornblower (Oxford, 1994), 77 and 80 (Derow does not discuss Polyb. 15.20.6, however).

52. Discussion in Walbank, *Polybius* (n. 49 above), 162–66.

53. See the programmatic discussion in Polyb. 3.6–10 with P. Pédech, *La méthode historique de Polybe* (Paris, 1964), 80–88; A. M. Eckstein, “Hannibal at New Carthage: Polybius 3.15 and the Power of Irrationality,” *CP* 84 (1989): esp. 1–3; Walbank, “Supernatural Paraphernalia in Polybius,” 40 and 42 = *Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World*, 255 and 257; Derow, “Historical Explanation” (n. 51 above), 86–89; cf. also, e.g., Polyb. 12.25b.1–4.

54. For the Polybian view that historical causes (αἰτίαι) are those factors that bring about human decisions, see Polyb. 3.6.7, with the scholarship in n. 53 above. On the analytical distinction between fundamental factors that favor war in an anarchic interstate system and the occurrence of specific catalysts—contingent events—that are necessary for the decisions that lead to the outbreak of particular wars, see R. N. Lebow, “Contingency, Catalysts, and International System Change,” *Political Science Quarterly* 115 (2000/01): 591–616.

Polybius himself may be a source of the traditions among Greek historical writers that it was the arrival of the Greek embassies at Rome, with their complaints against the kings, which led to the Roman decision to intervene. This appears to be the case at least with Appian.<sup>55</sup>

To conclude, this paper has demonstrated that Passerini and Walbank are very likely to be correct in their translation of Polybius 15.20.6: Polybius in this passage is telling his audience that “Tyche alerted the Romans” to the pact between Philip V and Antiochus III, and as a result of the Romans’ attention being drawn to the situation, the Romans intervened in the East, first against Philip, then—eventually—against Antiochus (20.7–8). We cannot know the details of how Polybius described the decision at Rome in winter 201/200, because that section of the *Histories* is lost. But this paper has argued that, contrary to the conclusions of some scholars that for Polybius the pact between the kings was not a factor in the Roman decision, or that we can really know nothing of Polybius’ analysis of what occurred at Rome in winter 201/200, Polybius 15.20.6 allows us to say that in all probability the pact between the kings and the arrival of Greek embassies at Rome complaining of the monarchs’ behavior played a significant role in Polybius’ conception of the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War. We do not know all the factors that Polybius presented in his account of the crucial Roman decision of winter 201/200. But we can now say that we at least know two of them—the embassies and the pact.<sup>56</sup>

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55. H.-U. Wiemer (*Rhodische Tradition in der hellenistischen Historiographie* [Frankfurt-am-Main, 2001], 82) argues that since Appian emphasizes the Rhodian report of the pact to the Senate, whereas Justin/Trogus emphasize a Ptolemaic report about the pact, Appian was ultimately dependent upon a writer who employed Rhodian sources for this period; Polybius used Rhodian sources (16.14–20); hence Appian ultimately goes back to Polybian material. This hypothesis is strengthened by the translation of Polyb. 15.20.6 offered here, according to which Polybius himself emphasized the role of Greek embassies in reporting the pact to Rome.

56. The author wishes to thank F. W. Walbank, H.-U. Wiemer, and the anonymous readers for *Classical Philology* for their very helpful comments and criticisms.